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Sudden Stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis 
with a reversal in capital flows (Calvo, 1998). We investigate the output effects of financial crises 
in emerging markets, focusing on whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and 
whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). 
Despite an emerging theoretical literature on Sudden Stops, empirical work to date has not 
precisely identified their occurrences nor measured their subsequent output effects in broad 
samples. Analysis of Sudden Stops may provide the key to understanding why some 
currency/balance of payments crises entail very large output losses, while others are frequently 
followed by expansions. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 
emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital 
inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. We find that sudden-stop crises have a large negative, 
but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A 
currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2-3 percent, while a Sudden Stop reduces output 
by an additional 6-8 percent in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a Sudden Stop 
is even larger, around 13-15 percent over a three-year period. Our model estimates correspond 
closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 
1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain the sudden (and 
seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997-98 Asian Crisis. The 
empirical results are robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using 
estimation procedures (IV and GMM) that correct for bias associated with simultaneity and 
estimation of dynamic panel models with country-specific effects.  
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“Sudden Stops” in capital flows to emerging market economies are a key characteristic of 
several recent financial crises. The sudden stop phenomenon, emphasized by Calvo (1998), 
features an abrupt cessation in foreign capital inflows and/or a sharp capital outflow concurrently 
with a currency/balance of payments crisis. Most currency/balance of payments crises are not 
characterized by Sudden Stops (Table 1). Capital inflow reversals occur with some regularity in 
emerging markets (about 22% of the observations in our sample), and currency crises are also 
fairly common (12% of the observations). But most of these occurrences are not the joint 
occurrence of capital flow reversals and currency/balance of payments crises-- Sudden Stops 
occur in only about 6% of the observations in our sample of emerging market economies.  
Sudden Stops may have severe consequences for the economy, as the abrupt reversal in 
foreign credit inflows may cause a sharp drop in domestic investment, domestic production and 
employment. The adverse consequences of a sharp reversal in foreign capital inflows could be the 
reason that only a subset of currency/balance-of-payments crises in emerging market economies 
are found to be associated with deep recessions (Gupta et al., 2000). The pattern of a sudden 
cessation in capital inflows and currency crisis followed by an abrupt, but short lived, output 
collapse has been termed the “Mexican Wave” by the Financial Times in light of the Mexican 
experience in 1995. By our metric, there have been 24 episodes of Sudden Stops among 
emerging markets since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate parities 
in the early 1970s (listed in the appendix).  
Recent theoretical literature, following the work of Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), emphasizes the linkages between Sudden Stops and output losses (e.g. Aghion et al., 
2001; Mendoza, 2001; and Gopinath, 2001). Sudden Stops cause particularly large drops in 
output when economies face financial frictions associated, for example, with price stickiness 
combined with an external financing premium (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999), debt-deflation 
combined with collateral constraints (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), and other forms of 
imperfect credit markets (e.g. Mendoza, 2001). 
Empirical work to date has not systematically distinguished between different types of 
currency/balance of payments crises, and this may help to explain the mixed results of studies 
attempting to measure the output effects of financial crises. Ventura (2000), for example, notes 
the importance of distinguishing between different types of current account reversals, and by   
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extension of currency crises, in attempting to evaluate their real output costs. Analysis of Sudden 
Stops may provide the key to understanding why some currency/balance of payments crises 
entail very large output losses, while others are frequently followed by expansions.  
To address this issue, we investigate the output growth dynamics following currency crises, 
capital flow reversals and Sudden Stops in a panel data set of 24 emerging-market economies 
covering the 1975-97 period. We measure the impact of crises in a panel regression framework, 
carefully controlling for domestic and external factors, country time-invariant effects, and state of 
the business cycle. Simultaneity between financial crises and output growth is likely in this 
context, and we employ the fixed-effects panel IV and GMM estimation procedures, respectively, 
of Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) to address this issue.  
We find that sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output 
growth over and above the effect found with currency crises. Our results also correspond very 
closely with the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey 
in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain the sudden (and 
seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997-98 Asian Crisis.  
Section 2 reviews the literature on Sudden Stops and highlights our contribution. Section 3 
presents the basic empirical model. Section 4 discusses the data employed in the study. Section 5 
reports summary statistics on key macroeconomic variables and the primary empirical results of 
the study. This section presents estimation results of the output equations, model dynamics and 
robustness checks.  Section 6 presents evidence as to the channel through which a sudden stop in 
capital inflows affects the real economy and how well the dynamics of the model correspond with 
the Mexican wave pattern of output losses. We also present predictions for output development in 
the East Asian crisis obtained by simulating our empirical results for the out-of-sample data for 
the five Asian 1998 crisis countries. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Why should a Sudden Stop cause a collapse in output?  
 
The sudden stop phenomenon involves a reversal in capital inflows associated with a 
currency and balance of payments crisis. There are several reasons why one would expect a 
Sudden Stop to cause a severe recession. Calvo (1998, 2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
analyse several mechanisms through which a sudden stop in international capital flows may bring   
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about a currency and balance of payments crisis and the reasons that an output collapse may 
follow.  The first mechanism may be termed the traditional Keynesian effect whereby a fall in 
credit, attributable to the sudden stop in capital inflows combined with an external financing 
premium and a “financial accelerator”, reduces aggregate demand and causes a fall in output (e.g. 
Bernanke et al., 1999).  
The second mechanism, termed the “Fisherian” channel by Mendoza (2001), emphasizes that 
a Sudden Stop enhances the severity of a currency crisis since it hits the financial sector and, 
given collateral constraints, induces a debt-deflation and a real contraction (e.g. Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997). Furthermore, firm bankruptcies may cause negative externalities-- banks may 
become more cautious and reduce loans. This is turn induces a further fall in credit—termed the 
“vanishing credit effect” by Calvo (2000)--and contributes to recession. Credit that would 
normally automatically be rolled over is now conditioned upon passing more in-depth viability 
tests. The resulting “highway congestion” in credit markets amounts to a negative supply shock.  
A number of new theoretical studies have developed models further formalizing the linkages 
between sudden stops in capital inflows, financial crises and declining output. This literature 
includes, among others, the works of Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2000), Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2000 and 2001), Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001), Daniel (2002), Gopinath 
(2001), Mendoza (2001), and Schneider and Tornell (2001).  
 
Empirical literature on Sudden Stops and output collapse 
By contrast with the rapidly emerging theoretical literature linking Sudden Stops with output 
losses, there is no empirical literature formally addressing this issue. Several recent papers 
empirically analyze output developments around the time of currency crises in broad samples of 
countries (e.g. Aziz et al., 2000; Gupta et al., 2000; Hutchison and Noy, forthcoming). Similarly, 
Barro (2001), Bordo et al. (2001) and Hutchison and Noy (2002) measure output costs associated 
with the occurrence of both currency crises and banking crises. 
No study of which we are aware, however, analyses Sudden Stops in the sense of a capital 
inflow reversal in tandem with a currency/balance of payments crisis. As Table 1 indicates, there 
are many instances of a currency crisis that are not associated with a capital flow reversal (about 
50% of the cases). Our objective is to focus on the joint occurrences that we believe are the best 
empirical representations of the Sudden Stop problem.     
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Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), in the work most closely related to ours on Sudden Stops, 
analyse separately the output costs of current account reversals and the output costs of currency 
crises.
1 They consider output developments around instances of current account reversals (and, 
separately, currency crises), and analyse the factors that influence these developments in the 
context of a cross-sectional data set of developing and emerging market economies.
2 Unlike our 
paper, however, they do not attempt to measure directly the marginal effect of a crisis or reversal 
on output growth either separately or jointly (holding other macroeconomic and institutional 
factors constant) in a panel data set of emerging markets.  
 
Section 3. Estimating the Effects of Sudden-Stop Crises on Real Output Growth 
Our contribution is to measure the output cost of a sudden-stop crisis. Unlike other literature 
that evaluates the outcomes of financial crises, we control for simultaneity issues, and biases 
associated with estimation of dynamic panel data models. Estimating this model for emerging 
market economies, we are also able to address whether sudden-stop crises are unique phenomena 
in general terms and whether the deep recessions in East Asia were typical of the “bad” outcome 
associated with sudden-stop crises.  
Our approach begins by explaining output growth in emerging markets by a standard set of 
variables. The determinants of output in this model are a set of domestic policy, structural, and 
external factors, as well as country-specific effects and lagged output growth. Domestic policy 
factors are changes in government budget surpluses and credit growth. External factors are 
growth in foreign output and real exchange rate overvaluation. The structural factor we consider 
is the openness of the economy to international trade. Country-specific fixed effects (in the 
context of panel data) are introduced in order to account for the widely varying growth 
experiences in our set of emerging-market economies over the past 25 years. All of the variables, 
with the exception of foreign output, are introduced with a one-year lag in order to capture the 
delayed response of output to macroeconomic developments. This formulation of the model 
avoids the potential for biased coefficient estimates on the domestic policy variables due to 
feedback effects from output growth to policy formulation (simultaneous equation bias).  
Our main concern with the benchmark model is to introduce relevant control variables into 
the regression equation so that the identified impact of a crisis on output growth is not simply due   
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to omitted-variables bias. We refrain from including a larger set of macroeconomic variables as 
these are typically not robust to model specification (Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
In the context of our benchmark model, we test for the additional effect on output growth 
arising from a currency crisis (we define the currency crisis and capital account reversal variables 
in section 4). We consider both lagged and contemporaneous effects of crises on output growth, 
and also estimate several variants of the model, including changes in the lag structure and 
definition of crises, to check the robustness of the basic results. The coefficient estimates on our 
crisis measure may be interpreted as the marginal effects of crises, after controlling for several of 
the other factors that may influence the evolution of output growth. Additionally, we include a 
‘capital account reversal’ variable and interpret its coefficient as the marginal effect of such a 
reversal on output growth. An interactive term of a capital account reversal and a currency crisis 
– which we label as a sudden-stop crisis – then permits us to directly estimate the effect of a 
sudden-stop crisis on the evolution of output. 
The formal specification of the empirical model is as follows. The growth of real GDP for the 
ith country at time t ( it y ) is explained by policy variables ( ) 1 (  t i x ); external and structural factors 
( ) ( i w ); the recent occurrence of a currency crisis and a current account reversal ( CC
i D ) ( ,  KA
i D ) ( ), a 
sudden-stop crisis ( CC
i D ) ( * KA





i D SS KA
i D KA CC
i D CC
i w h t i x k it y                      ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0
                            (1) 
Policy reaction function: 
where x is a k-element vector of policy variables for country i at time t, w is an h-element 
vector of external variables for country i at times (t or t-1),  CC
t i D ) ( is a dummy variable equal to 
unity if the country has recently experienced a currency crisis or balance of payments crisis (and 
zero otherwise) and likewise for a capital account reversal. The interactive term is therefore equal 
to unity if a currency crisis and a capital account reversal were observed in the same year.  it   is a 
zero mean, fixed variance, disturbance term.  0   is a vector of country effects (allowing average 
growth rates to vary across countries in the sample),  k  is a k-element vector measuring the 
impact of policy changes on output,  h   is an h-element vector measuring the impact of   
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exogenous factors on output, and 
CC  , 
KA   and 
SS  measure the output growth effects of a 
currency crisis, a capital account reversal and a sudden-stop crisis, respectively. In our robustness 
regressions we examine possible non-linearities and size effects for the crises variables, a larger 
sample including developing countries and different estimation methods. 
In our main estimates we follow a procedure first suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
that takes into account the bias in estimation of a dynamic panel with predetermined and 
endogenous variables (for a rigorous formulation of this bias, see Nickel, 1981). When a 
correlation exists between the independent variables and the individual country-specific effects, a 
least-squares estimation of a dynamic model ignores the correlation between the time-invariant 
country-fixed effects and the error term. A similar correlation between the “crisis” explanatory 
variables and the error term exists when output fluctuations contribute to the onset of a crisis. The 
Hausman-Taylor three-step estimation methodology is an instrumental variable estimator that 
takes into account the possible correlation between the independent variables and the individual 
country-specific effects, as well possible simultaneity issues running from output growth (our 
dependent variable) and currency crises and capital account reversals and their interaction (three of 
the explanatory variables). 
  In the first step, least squares estimates (with fixed effects) are employed to obtain 
consistent but inefficient estimates for the variance components for the coefficients of the time-
varying variables. In the second step, an FGLS procedure is employed to obtain variances for the 
time-invariant variables. The third step is a weighted IV estimation using deviation from means 
of lagged values of the time-varying variables as instruments.
3 The procedure requires specifying 
which explanatory variables are to be treated as endogenous. In our specification, the endogenous 
explanatory variables are the three binary crisis measures (currency, reversals and Sudden Stops) 
and the lagged dependent variable.
4   
  While the Hausman-Taylor (HT) procedure provides asymptotically unbiased estimates, a 
recent literature suggests it is not the most efficient estimator possible. A more efficient General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure relies on utilizing more available moment conditions to 
obtain a more efficient estimation (e.g., Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; and Arellano and Bond, 1991 
and 1998).
5 This procedure, however, is usually employed in estimation of panels with a large 
number of individuals and short time-series such as in the literature on long-run growth (Bond et 
al., 2001). In our case, the data makes this procedure difficult to implement for most   
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specifications of the model. We provide some results using the Arellano and Bond (1998) GMM 




Section 4. Data Description 
We concentrate our investigation on emerging markets since they are the focus of policy 
discussions and recent experiences of financial crises and output collapses. Several recent studies 
indicate that emerging markets may be different with respect to the factors that make them 
susceptible to a financial crisis (Glick and Hutchison, 2001; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2002) 
and how they respond to them (IMF, 1998). Specifically, emerging markets tend to be open to 
international capital inflows, and have experienced pre-crisis large private inflows that are 
typically short-term. Large short-term foreign-currency debt positions also increase the 
vulnerability of these economies to swings in exchange rates and cessation of new capital to roll 
over existing debt. Emerging markets therefore appear most vulnerable to sudden-stop crises and, 
potentially, their adverse consequences. 
 
Defining Currency and Balance of Payments Crises  
Our indicator of currency and balance of payments crises is constructed by identifying “large” 
values in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange 
rate changes and monthly (percent) international reserve losses.
7 Following convention (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of 
each component over the sample for each country. This excludes some large depreciations that 
occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizeable depreciation events in 
more moderate inflation periods for countries that have occasionally experienced periods of 
hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
8 Our measure, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2001), 
presumes that any nominal currency changes or reserve changes associated with exchange rate 
pressure should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in 
the real exchange rate (at least in the short run). An episode of serious exchange rate pressure, i.e. 
a standard crisis episode, is defined as a value in the index—a threshold point-- that exceeds the 
mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds 5 
percent.
9 The first condition insures that, relative to its own history, unusually large values of the   
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index of currency pressure are counted as a crisis while the second condition attempts to screen 
out values that are insufficiently large in an economic (real) sense.  
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given 
year if the currency pressure index for any month of that year satisfies our criteria. To reduce the 
chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose windows on 
our data. In particular, after identifying each indication of currency pressure, we treat any similar 
threshold point reached in the following 24-month window as a part of the same currency episode 
and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new crises. With this 
methodology, we identify 51 currency crises, 68 crisis years and 40 major currency crises for our 
emerging markets dataset over the 1975-97 period (see appendix). 
 
Defining Capital Account Reversals and Sudden-Stop Crises  
As in Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998 and 2000) we identify capital account reversals by 
examining changes in the current account deficit. As our focus is on the short and medium term 
costs of sudden-stop events, we define a capital account reversal as a positive change in the 
annual current account surplus that is bigger than a pre-specified threshold (measured as a 
percentage of current GDP).10 Following Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) we use thresholds of 
3% (5%) for standard (major) current account reversals.11 Similarly to our currency crisis 
variable, we construct, for each country-year, a binary measure of reversals, as defined above (1 
= reversal, 0 = no reversal) for both thresholds and impose a 24-month window on our data.12  
We use an alternative definition for capital account reversals in our robustness tests. We 
impose an additional condition that the post-reversal current account deficit is higher than –1% of 
GDP. This is motivated by the hypothesis that capital inflow reversals will be especially painful 
if they constitute an almost complete stop in capital inflows (or even capital outflows). In our 
robustness checks we also control for the size of the reversal (as a percent of GDP).  
We define a sudden-stop crisis as one in which there is the contemporaneous occurrence of a 
currency crisis (a deviation in our currency pressure index of more than two standard deviations), 
and a capital account reversal (a change in the current account of more than 3% of GDP). As we 
examine contemporaneous occurrences, we do not speculate on the exact casualty structure 




Control Variables in the Output Growth Equation 
As discussed in section 2, the domestic policy factors included in our estimation are lagged 
changes in government budgets and lagged credit growth; external factors are (trade-weighted) 
external growth rates of the G-3 and lagged index of real exchange rate overvaluation; and the 
structural factor we consider is the openness of the economy to international trade.
13 The 
macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM. 
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP figures are 
available for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. We use annual 
observations. We employ monthly data for our (real) exchange rate and international reserves 
pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs; monthly or 
quarterly data on current account deficits is available only for a sub-sample of our emerging 
markets sample so we use annual data for the identification of reversals.  
 
Section 5. Empirical Results  
Table 1 presents the number and frequency of currency crises, capital flow reversals and 
Sudden Stops for our data set. The top panel is for “normal” currency crises and the lower panel 
is for “major” currency crises. The panels are divided into four parts: the upper left quadrant 
shows the number and frequency of sudden stop crises (combination of a currency crisis and a 
capital flow reversal); the lower left quadrant reports the number and frequency of currency 
crises not associated with reversals; the upper right quadrant gives the number and frequency of 
capital flow reversals not associated with currency crises; and the lower right quadrant represent 
the number and frequency of tranquil episodes (neither a currency crisis nor a capital flow 
reversal).  
Tranquil periods are the most common, of course, representing 72 percent of the sample 
observations (300 observations). Sudden-stop crises (24 observations) and currency crises (25 
cases without capital reversals) each represent about 6 percent of the sample. Capital flow 
reversals without currency crises are more frequent, at about 16 percent of the sample. With the 
higher threshold levels for major crises shown in the lower panel, the frequency of occurrences is 
lower but the basic pattern is the same as with the standard crisis definitions. Clearly, sudden-  
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stop crises are not one and the same with currency crises nor with capital flow reversals. It is not 
uncommon to have capital flow reversals without currency crises and vice versa. Sudden Stops 
are distinct phenomena.  
 
Conditional Probabilities for Crises Onsets 
Table 2 presents hypothesis tests on the likelihood that currency crises and capital account 
reversals (both standard and major) are statistically independent. The hypothesis that they are not 
correlated when a currency crisis occurs contemporaneously with a capital account reversal 
cannot be rejected. Yet, the hypothesis that the occurrence of a capital account reversal is not 
associated with a currency crisis in the previous year can be clearly rejected with probability of 
more than 99%. Furthermore, there is no statistically significant correlation between 
contemporaneous currency crises and lagged reversals. While this observation is suggestive as to 
the possible causal links between the two, assuming a causal link is not necessary for the 
empirical work and discussion that follow. 
 
Macro Developments: Before/After Crises Statistics  
Table 3 presents summary statistics on key macroeconomic developments around currency 
crises (upper panel) and capital account reversals (lower panel). It presents before-after statistics 
for the standard definitions of a ‘normal’ currency crisis and the standard (3%) capital account 
reversal event as described in section 4. Four-year windows are imposed on the data to clearly 
delineate the macroeconomic developments around the time of crises.  
Our focus variable, real GDP growth, shows an average decline of about 1.3 percentage 
points in the year a currency crisis takes place, and it recovers only minimally the following year 
(by 0.3 percentage points). Average output growth goes back to its previous level two years after 
the crisis, and this upturn is statistically significant. This pattern is almost identical for standard 
and major crises (not reported for brevity). Average losses appear to be somewhat bigger 
(smaller) for our sub-sample of currency crises with (without) a capital account reversal--
reducing output growth by 1.5 (1.1) percentage points, respectively.  
By contrast, output developments around capital account reversals are striking both by the 
larger costs involved (1.9 percentage points for the year of the reversal) and by the rapid growth 
turnaround. A capital account reversal is typically followed by an increase in output growth of   
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3.3 percentage points in the following year. Hence, at first pass, the summary statistics indicate 
significant and—in some cases—prolonged effects of financial crises and a short-lived but more 
pronounced effect of a capital account reversal.  
 
Benchmark Model Estimates  
Table 4 presents results from our benchmark model. The statistically significant control 
variables are external output growth, real exchange rate overvaluation, and lagged output growth. 
A one- percent rise in the growth rate of the G-3 economies raises output growth in emerging-
market economies by about, on average, 0.3-0.4 percentage points. A rise in real exchange rate 
overvaluation significantly reduces output growth. This is noteworthy in its own right, indicating 
that emerging market economies should avoid currency overvaluation, but also because real 
exchange rate overvaluation is a reliable predictor of future currency crises (see Glick and 
Hutchison, 2001). However, the coefficients for budget changes, credit growth and the openness 
measure are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimates for the control 
variables are consistent across many alternative specifications of the model reported in columns 
(1)-(4) of table 4 and in the other tables. 
Turning to the currency/balance of payments crisis variables, the coefficient estimates 
reported in column (2) indicate that the onset of a currency crisis is associated with a 
contemporaneous (lagged) fall in GDP growth of about 2.5 (2.6) percentage points. Very similar 
results are obtained, but not reported, when including only the contemporaneous or the lagged 
currency crisis binary variable. After a two-year period, the cumulative negative effect of a 
currency crisis on output is therefore about 5.1 percent.  
Table 4 also presents more information on the dynamics of output adjustment to currency 
crises. Adding further lags (second, third and fourth year lags) to the model, reported in column 
(3), indicate that the contemporaneous and one-year ahead effects of a currency crisis remain 
negative and highly significant and with the same magnitudes as reported previously. This is 
followed by statistically insignificant effects on the second, third and fourth year following a 
crisis. This result remains when some of the insignificant lags are dropped. Our results therefore 
predict that the output costs of a currency crisis do not extend beyond a two-year horizon.   
We also include lead values of currency crises in the equations, shown in column (4), to 
further investigate the dynamic responses. The one-year lead coefficient for the currency crisis   
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variable is statistically significant. This result indicates that a currency crisis tends to follow a 
decline in real output growth. On the other hand, a currency crisis is also associated with a further 
decline in output growth contemporaneously and over a period of two years. These model 
estimates suggest that, within 4 years, output declines cumulatively by almost 8 percent for an 
average currency crisis in an emerging-market economy. 
An important question is whether a particularly severe crisis—substantially larger than the 
normal crisis—has an especially severe effect on growth. To investigate this issue, we introduce a 
“major” currency crisis variable that is identified by a threshold point in our pressure index that 
exceeds 3-standard deviations from the mean. For brevity we do not report these results. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the output effects of a major crisis are not larger than the typical crisis 
situation. Coefficients for a version of column (2) using the major crisis measure yield 
coefficients of –2.3 and –2.8 for the contemporaneous and lagged major currency crisis variables, 
respectively. Major currency and balance of payments crises therefore do not appear to have a 
substantially different impact on output growth than the average crisis (identified using a 2-
standard deviation threshold).     
 
Reversals and Sudden Stops 
The full results for our model are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the cost 
of a capital account reversal for the 5 percent and 3 percent thresholds, respectively, with the 
inclusion of lagged and contemporaneous currency crises variables. In both cases, reversals are 
costly. Surprisingly, “normal-sized” reversals (3 percent of GDP) seem to have, on average, a 
larger effect on output growth (with almost 2 percentage points decline) than do large reversals 
(1.2 percentage point decline).
14  
Our main results are presented in columns (3)-(4). The coefficient on the sudden-stop 
crisis interactive variable is negative, large and statistically significant. The output costs of 
sudden-stop crises appear to be very large—a drop in output growth of 4.7-6.5 percentage points 
in the same year of the crisis.  Furthermore, while the coefficients on the currency crisis variables 
are smaller they are still statistically significant for the 99% confidence level. Neither does the 
inclusion of leads and lags for the capital account reversal dummy, reported in column (5), 
change the magnitude of these coefficients.
15 We find that a sudden-stop crisis has a very large   
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To check the robustness of our results we first examine whether our estimation technique, 
based on the Hausman and Taylor (1981) IV estimator, gives similar coefficient estimates to 
those obtained by the least-squares fixed effects estimator with a White heteroscedasticity 
correction (LSDV) or the more efficient first-differenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991 and 1998). These results are reported in Table 6, columns (1)-(3), where we also 
include the HT estimation for exactly the same sample.16 There is relatively little difference 
between the coefficients obtained on our focus variables—currency crises and reversals—in all 
three estimation techniques. As can be expected, the GMM estimator yields higher t-statistics.  
We also run the same model for a larger sample including 42 developing countries as well as 
the emerging markets sample. Data availability guided our choice of additional countries.17 A 
comparison of column (4) with column (2) in Table 5 leads us to conclude that both currency 
crises, reversals and Sudden Stops have a weaker impact on output growth in our larger sample 
of developing countries-- -1.5 instead of –1.9 for lagged currency crises, -1.1 instead of –2.0 for 
capital account reversals and –3.6 instead of –6.6 for sudden-stop crises. Column (5) adds a 
lagged currency crises variable, which further reduces the coefficient on our sudden-stop 
variable. The larger set of developing countries does indeed seem to be less vulnerable, on 
average, to both turmoil in currency markets and reversals in capital flows than emerging 
markets. This may simply be attributable to the fact that poor developing countries attract very 
little private capital inflows and hence a substantial reversal observable in the current account is 
different.  
In column (6) of Table 6 we investigate whether the main results are robust when we account 
for the size of the capital account reversal. To our central regression--reported in table 5 column 
(4)--we add the size of the capital flow reversal as a percentage of GDP. The coefficient on the 
reversal’s size variable is statistically different from zero and indicates that any flow reversal of 
one percent (of GDP) reduced output growth by 0.2 percentage points. More central to our 
argument is the finding that the coefficient on the sudden-stop dummy does not change much—
indicating that non-linearities are important in understanding the effects of crises. A Sudden Stop   
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is found to constitute a unique event that is important above and beyond the actual size of the 
reversal.  
In column (7) of table 6 we modify the definition used for a current account reversal and its 
corresponding sudden-stop interactive term. We now use only a subset of our reversal 
observations—only those for which the reversal actually meant a full stop of capital inflows. 
Technically, we discard reversal observations for which the current account deficit, following the 
reversal event was still bigger than 1 percent of GDP. As can be expected the coefficient on the 
newly defined sudden-stop variable is now even bigger and indicates a drop of 8 percentage 
points in GDP growth in the same year of the crisis. This result further supports our other 
findings on the very substantial negative average effects of Sudden Stops.  
It is possible that the results reported to this point are subject to sample selection bias. 
Countries that experience a currency crisis may be different in important respects from other 
countries or episodes. That is, it may not be the currency crisis per se but several other factors 
contributing to them that are causing the decline in output growth. This is a variant of the sample 
selection bias problem.  
We employ Heckman’s (1979) Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to control for sample selection bias 
of this form. This statistic is constructed from the results of a probit regression explaining 
currency crises and added as an additional explanatory variable in the output growth 
regressions.18 Including the IMR in the regression of interest prevents possible bias in our 
coefficient estimates and is a standard approach to account for sample selection bias.19 For 
brevity, these results are not reported. In no case is the IMR coefficient statistically significant 
and, assuming the probit equation was correctly specified, sample selection bias may be rejected. 
More importantly, the coefficient estimates on the other explanatory factors, both the control and 
the crisis variables, are very similar to those reported in table 5.  
 
Section 6. Predictive Accuracy, Dynamics and Channels of Transmission 
Out of Sample Predictions 
The models in the previous section explain up to 45 percent of the variation in output growth 
in our sample of emerging market economies. The sudden-stop proxy variables are highly 
significant and contribute to the overall explanatory power of the models. As an additional test of 
the robustness of the findings, we consider out-of-sample predictions for countries involved in   
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the 1997 Asian crisis and subsequent collapse in output. All of these countries experienced 
Sudden Stops. In particular, Table 7 presents the predicted values for output growth for the five 
East Asian countries that experienced a severe financial crisis in 1997 and large output 
contractions in 1998—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These 
predictions are for 1998 output growth rates and are based on 1997 values of the explanatory 
variables and the coefficient estimates obtained from the model presented in column (4) of Table 
5. Predicted values are decomposed into three different groups of explanatory variables: (a) 
domestic factors (lagged output growth, change in budget surplus, credit growth, and country-
specific effects); (b) external/structural factors (external growth, real exchange rate overvaluation 
and openness); and (c) the currency crisis, the capital account reversal and the sudden-stop crises.  
Predicted output growth (from the Sudden Stop model) for all five countries is around 
negative 5 percent in 1998. Output is predicted to be worst for the Philippines (-5.2%) and best 
for Korea (-4.5%), with intermediate predictions for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The 
forecast errors (unexpected declines in output) are therefore substantial as the growth 
performances of the Philippines and Korea were radically different in 1998. At the extremes, the 
Philippines experienced the mildest recession (-0.5 output growth rate) while Indonesia 
experienced a -14.1 percent contraction of its economy. More importantly for our focus, the 
contemporaneous negative effect of a sudden-stop crisis is dominating our predictions with a 
cumulative negative effect of –9.4 percentage point decline in GDP growth. There is a positive 
domestic effect – mainly a history of very strong growth in the region and the consequently large 
country-specific effects-- and a modestly supportive external structural growth environment.  
Although the forecast errors of the sudden-stop model are fairly large, the average prediction 
of a substantial decline in output (-5.0 percent) across four of the East Asian countries (Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) is quite close to the actual average decline in output (-6.5 
percent). Indonesia, perhaps due to political and social turmoil, seems to be a special case and 
experienced a –14.2 percent drop in output. Moreover, besides the sudden-stop model, we are not 
aware of other models that forecast (out-of-sample) large declines in output for East Asia in   
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1998. Hutchison and Noy (2002), for example, examined the output effects of currency, banking 
and “twin” crises. They conclude that “twin” crises lead to significant real costs, but cannot 
explain the depth of the recessions and the rapid recovery that the Asian-5 experienced between 
1997 and 1999.  
 
Dynamics and the Mexican Wave 
The V-shaped output developments of the Asian-5 following the financial crisis also appear 
to fit the pattern associated with the Mexican Wave. Panel A of Figure 1 presents the output 
developments around some of the most famous sudden-stop crises: Turkey (1994), Mexico 
(1995), Indonesia (1998) and Korea (1998). Turkey, Indonesia and Korea follow the same output 
dynamics as Mexico--sharp output declines at the time of the crisis followed by large rebounds.  
The sudden-stop model predictions, shown in Panel B of Figure 1, also correspond closely 
with the country experiences shown above. The panel shows the dynamic predictions for output 
around the time of a (i) currency crisis, (ii) a capital flow reversal, and (iii) a Sudden Stop.20 
Both currency crises and capital flow reversals, taken alone, are associated with modest declines 
in output. Taken together, however, they constitute a Sudden Stop and induce a very large but 
short-lived drop in output. The model estimates mimic very closely the actual dynamics of 
Sudden Stops observed in Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, Korea.   
 
Channels of Transmission: Sudden Stops and Collapsing Investment 
The sudden-stop theory reviewed in section 2 discussed several potential transmission 
mechanisms through which Sudden Stops could cause an output collapse. A common element in 
these explanations is that a Sudden Stop causes domestic investment to collapse, perhaps through 
financing constraints that sharply limit imported investment goods or imported intermediate 
goods.  
This view appears to be borne out. Table 8 shows average domestic investment growth, 
domestic fixed investment growth, export growth, and import growth around the 24 sudden-stop 
crises that we have identified in our emerging-market sample. Investment and imports are sharply 
reduced at the time of Sudden Stops. In particular, investment (import) growth was 8.5% (11.0%) 
two years prior to the Sudden Stop, decreases to 0.8% (2.0%) one-year prior, and then shows a 
large 6.0% (2.5%) drop at the time of the Sudden Stop.  The declines in investment and imports   
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continue for two years, and then sharply rebound two years after the sudden-stop crisis. By 
contrast, exports boom both the year of the crisis and in the year following the Sudden Stop. 
These stylised facts are consistent with several case studies. Agénor et al. (2000) find, for 
example, that the sharp contraction in bank lending accompanying Thailand’s financial crisis was 
due to a “supply crunch” on credit (presumably due to foreign financial constraints). Ghosh and 
Ghosh (1999) report similar findings for Korea and Indonesia as do Ito and da Silva (1999). 
Microeconomic research into firms’ responses to changes in the exchange rate also suggests that 
firms generally reduce their investment when facing large domestic currency depreciation 
(Forbes, 2001 and Nucci and Pozzolo, 2001). 
 
Section 7. Conclusions 
The sudden-stop phenomenon seems to provide the key to understanding why some 
currency/balance of payments crisis entail very large output losses, while others are frequently 
followed by expansions. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 
emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital 
inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. We find that sudden-stop crises have a large negative, 
but short-lived, impact on output growth; and that these effects are substantially larger (almost 
three times greater) than those associated with a currency crisis alone. The empirical results are 
robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using estimation procedures (IV and 
GMM) that correct for bias associated with simultaneity and estimation of dynamic panel models 
with country-specific effects.  
The sudden-stop model predictions also mimic the output dynamics of many countries facing 
sudden-stop crises. The Mexican Wave pattern that the model predicts was seen not only in 
Mexico at the time of the 1995 crisis, but also in such disparate countries facing Sudden Stops as 
Turkey, Indonesia and Korea. The channel of transmission also appears consistent with theory 
that points to an external “credit crunch” as a key element in capital flow reversals at the time of 
a currency crisis. Sudden Stops are associated with a collapse of imported goods and a dramatic 
fall in domestic investment. Clearly, the large output costs associated with Sudden Stops are a 
policy concern; even more so if the underlying cause of the capital inflow reversal and currency 
crisis are not attributable to “fundamentals” but rather to multiple equilibria or imperfections in 
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Table 1 – Sudden Stops 
a 
  Number of Events (Percentage of Sample) 
‘Normal’ Crises and Capital Flow Reversals 






No Reversal  25 (6%) 
Tranquil period 
300 (72%) 
Major Crises and Major Capital Flow Reversals 










a For currency crises, a standard crisis is defined as a deviation of the currency 
pressure index of more than 2 standard deviations from the country-specific mean (3 
standard deviations for major crises). For the current account reversal, a standard 
reversal is defined as a change in the current account to GDP ratio of more than 3 
percentage points (5% points for a major CA reversal). The number in parentheses is 
the percent out of country years in our sample.   
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% of CA reversals associated with a 






% of currency crisis associated with a 





% of CA reversals associated with a 





% of currency crisis associated with a 





a chi square probability of independence of the two series in parenthesis. 
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Type of Crisis  t-2 t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 
A. Currency Crises 
Currency  4.0 2.7 1.4 1.7 3.6* 
Currency (no reversal)  4.2 3.5 2.4 2.2 3.4 
Real GDP growth 
rate (%) 
Sudden Stop  3.8 2.0 0.5 1.3 3.8* 
Currency  -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 
Currency (no reversal)  -1.8 -1.7 -0.9 -1.5 -1.2 
Change in budget 
surplus (%) 
Sudden Stop  -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -0.6 -1.2 
Currency  30.5 31.6 36.3 43.4 42.0 
Currency (no reversal)  36.4 38.7 36.2 40.5 47.3  Inflation rate (%) 
Sudden Stop  23.3 23.0 34.4 44.0 34.9 
Currency  -4.4 -4.3 -4.0 -1.4* -0.4 
Currency (no reversal)  -2.8 -2.5 -3.0 -2.1 0.9* 
Current account to 
GDP ratio (%) 
Sudden Stop  -5.7 -4.8 -0.8* -1.3 -2.2 
 
B. Capital Account Reversals 
Real GDP growth rate (%)  5.4 4.6  2.7**  6.0***  5.9 
Change in budget surplus (%)  -0.9 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 0.1 
Inflation rate (%)  18.2 19.5 30.9 17.4 12.6 
Current account to GDP ratio (%)  -5.5  -7.5  0.9***  0.8  -0.9 
a *, **, and *** denote rejection of same mean as the number to the left with 10, 5 and 1 percent 
confidence levels.   
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Table 4 - Growth Equation – HT – Benchmark 
a 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (DLRGDP)
 






















































































Adjusted R2 e  0.27 0.32 0.32 0.33 
Number of observations  374 373 370 370 
Correlation of error terms  0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 
a The Adjusted R
2 reported is for the fixed-effects least squares stage in the Hausman-Taylor procedure. 
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Table 5 - Growth Equation – HT - Current Account Reversals 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (DLRGDP)
 




























































Current Account Reversal (5% threshold)  -1.122* 
(-1.75) 
    
Lead for Current Account Reversal (3%) (t+1) 
    
-0.683 
(-0.90) 










Lag for Current Account Reversal (3%) (t-1) 
    
-0.480 
(-0.58) 




























0.35 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.44 
Number of observations 
374 374 374 374 320 
Correlation of error terms 
0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.19 
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Table 6 - Growth Equation - Robustness 




















































































































Currency crises dummy (t) 





















sudden-stop crises dummy (t) 









Reversal’s size (t) 




Sample  280 280 280 550 550 320 320 
a The sample contains also developing countries (with per capita income of less the 2000 in PPP$ for 1992. 
b C(7) includes a different definition of current account reversals. In addition to (1) a change of at least 3% of GDP, it includes (2) the post 
reversal current account is above –1% of GDP. 
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Indonesia  3.69  0.58  -1.87 -0.92 -6.59  -5.11 -14.16 
Korea  3.78  1.13  -1.87 -0.92 -6.59  -4.47  -6.92 
Malaysia  3.83  0.54  -1.87 -0.92 -6.59  -5.01  -7.65 
Philippines  3.74  0.40  -1.87 -0.92 -6.59  -5.24  -0.54 
Thailand  3.63  0.81  -1.87 -0.92 -6.59  -4.94 -10.73 
 
a Estimates are based on Table 5 column (4) coefficients. 




Table 8 – Investment, Exports and Imports Around Sudden-Stops 
a 
 
  t-2 t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
Domestic investment growth  8.50 0.84 -5.96  -4.81 8.07 
Domestic fixed investment growth  6.87 2.81 -4.53  -7.82 3.83 
Export growth  5.41  2.49 13.05 9.96  3.31 
Import growth  11.04 2.03 -2.55 -1.03 11.51 
Exports b  17.98 17.97 20.17 22.76 24.41 
Imports b  21.00 21.96 20.91 19.20 21.87 
a Data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2001. 
b Average in billion constant 1995 US$.   
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Figure 1 – Output Developments 
 
 

























































Data for Currency and Sudden-Stop Crises 
  Currency Crises  Sudden-Stop Crises 
Argentina  1975-1976, 1982-1983, 1989-1991  1989 
Brazil  1982-1983, 1987, 1990-1991, 1995  1987 
Chile 1985   
Hong Kong (China, P.R.)      
Columbia 1985  1985 
Costa Rica  1981  1981 
Cyprus      
Indonesia  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997  1983, 1986 
Jordan  1983, 1987-1989, 1992  1989, 1992 
Korea 1980,  1997   
Malaysia 1986,  1997  1986 
Malta 1992,  1997  1997 
Mauritius 1979,  1981   
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994-1995  1982, 1994 
Panama      
Philippines  1983-1984, 1986, 1997  1983, 1986 
Singapore 1975  1975 
South Africa  1975, 1978, 1984-1986, 1996  1984 
Thailand  1981, 1984, 1997  1981, 1997 
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993  1985 
Tunisia 1993   
Turkey 1978-1980,  1994  1994 
Uruguay 1982-1983  1982 









                                                           
1 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) also explore the determinants of the costs of reversals. They consider a 
cross-section of current account reversal episodes in a sample of 86 low and middle-income developing 
economies for the period 1971-1992. They search for the determinants of reversals and find both domestic 
and external variables that seem to play a role in explaining their occurrence. They find that a less 
appreciated exchange rate, higher investment and more openness prior to the reversal make recovery faster 
and more pronounced. 
 
2 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) examine a cross section of currency crises and current account reversals 
in a broad set of 105 low and middle-income countries (for 1970-1996). They identify the determinants of 
reversals and currency crises in probit regression and also provide an analysis of the costs of each 
separately (in terms of output growth). They estimate a linear cross-sectional model with average output 
growth in the 3 years following the episode in question as the dependent variable and identify 
macroeconomic variables that determine the costs of such episodes (either a currency crisis or a current 
account reversal).    
3 In the final step all variables are transformed by:  vit*  =  vit  -  (1 - i) i v  where  i  =  
2 2
2




where  vit denotes any of the aforementioned variables and  i v denotes a group mean and the variance 
components are the one obtained in first two steps. For exact details on the motivation and estimation 
procedure, see Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Greene (2001) respectively. 
 
4 Assuming any of the other control variables is not exogenous does not change our empirical results 
 
5 For a detailed survey of asymptotic consistency results and GMM estimation methods casting doubts on 
some of the results in this literature, see Arellano and Honoré (forthcoming) and Bond et al. (2001). 
 
6 We use the Limdep software suite in all our estimations. We thank Professor William Greene for generously 
providing us with an update of the LIMDEP package and some of the statistical procedures used to estimate 
the models.  
  
7 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defence involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in 
many of the countries in our dataset. 
 
8 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes 
of hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country 
according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they 
calculate for each sub-sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define 
exchange rate crisis episodes. 
 
9 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off point is 
somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise 
cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. Our output equation estimates using “major” currency crises, 
evaluated with the 3-standard deviation threshold, are very similar to the benchmark crisis measure. 
 
10 In contrast, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) examine changes in 3-year rolling averages of the current 
account. They also impose a condition that the maximum deficit after the reversal must be no larger than   
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the minimum deficit in the 3 years preceding the reversal. In our identification of reversal episodes we are 
interested in short-run to medium run phenomena and therefore we examine annual changes in the current 
account.  
 
11 Their work indicate that the exact (and admittedly ad-hoc) threshold used does not affect their results 
significantly. We present results to that effect as well. 
 
12 Bagnai and Manzoochi (1999) use a different statistical methodology to differentiate between 
permanent and transitory changes in current account trends and define permanent changes as reversal 
episodes. They find that GDP growth is not statistically significant in their regression for the determinants 
of positive reversals, giving some support to the Sudden Stop argument that reversal episodes are a 
leading causal factor in declining output growth.    
 
13 The 'openness' variable is defined as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP. Real exchange rate 
overvaluation is defined as deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. The real 
trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (defined in 
terms of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade-weights 
are based on the average bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 
1990. 
 
14 The difference between the two estimates is not statistically significant. 
 
15 Interestingly, both the coefficients on the lead and lag of capital account reversals are insignificantly 
different from zero. 
 
16 The sample here is somewhat smaller than the one used in the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. The 
GMM estimator poses both data restrictions and restrictions on the models that could be estimated with 
our data. 
 
17 We also restricted our sample for non-OECD countries with a population of more than one million. 
 
18 The exact specification of the probit regression is taken from Glick and Hutchison, 2001. Details are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
19 For a survey of sample selection correction methodologies see Blundell and Costa Días (2000) and for 
empirical examination of the IMR model see Heckman (1990). 
 
20 These predictions are derived from an output equation, not reported in the text for brevity, where two 
leads and lags of currency crises, capital flow reversals, and Sudden Stops are included. The control 
variables are the same as in the benchmark equations (e.g. Table 4, column 1).  